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The ICWA’s Pre-Existing Custody Requirement: A Flexible Approach 
to Better Protect the Interests of Indian Fathers, Children, and Tribes 
By Jeffrey A. Parness & Amanda Beveroth* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to 
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and 
security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal 
standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the 
placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the 
unique values of Indian culture . . . .1  
Congress’s declaration of policy through the Indian Child Welfare Act (the “ICWA”) 
captures the broad scope of interests that the ICWA is intended to protect in Indian adoptions.2 
The ICWA provides heightened protections aimed at preserving the relationship not only between 
Indian children and their families, but also between Indian children and their tribes—as children 
are central to tribes’ continuing culture and community.3 Among its protections, the ICWA 
provides that an Indian parent’s parental rights cannot be terminated unless the parent’s 
“continued custody” of the child will result in “serious emotional or physical damage to the 
child.”4 In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, the U.S. Supreme Court first 
recognized the unique tribal interests in Indian children, holding that the ICWA should broadly 
apply in custody proceedings involving an Indian child.5 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl implicated the ICWA’s policy of safeguarding the unique interests 
of Indian tribes, Indian families, and Indian children.6 
The Adoptive Couple case, involving the daughter of a Cherokee father and non-Indian 
mother, captured the nation’s attention when it reached the Supreme Court.7 Relying on the 
ICWA’s language of “continued custody,” the Court found that the ICWA requires pre-existing 
custody before its protections apply.8 Significantly, the ICWA’s “continued custody” requirement 
has the potential to severely limit the application of its protections in cases involving unwed 
biological Indian fathers without physical custody.9 Limiting the ICWA’s protections not only 
impacts unwed Indian fathers’ interests, but also impacts tribal interests in their children, as tribes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Jeffrey A. Parness is a Professor Emeritus at Northern Illinois University College of Law. He obtained his Bachelor of Arts from 
Colby College and his Juris Doctor from the University of Chicago. Amanda Beveroth is a Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2015, at 
Northern Illinois University College of Law. She would like to thank all of her family and friends for their patience and support 
throughout the writing process. In addition, a special thanks to Professor Parness for collaborating. 
1 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2012).  
2 See, e.g., Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 35–37 (1989); In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489–
90 (S.D. 1990).  
3 See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 35. 
4 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2012). 
5 See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 34–37. 
6 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). 
7 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558; see, e.g., “Baby Veronica” Handed Over to Adoptive Parents, Cherokee Nation Confirms, CBS 
NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013, 1:04 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/baby-veronica-handed-over-to-adoptive-parents-cherokee-nation-
confirms/.  
8 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560–62. 
9 See id. at 2572–73 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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are self-governing communities.10 Also impacted are Indian children’s interests to be raised, to 
participate, and to benefit from their parents’ and tribes’ culture and community.11 This Article 
argues that “continued custody” should not be limited to physical custody. Rather, “continued 
custody” should also include efforts to meaningfully accept the role of parenthood so that unwed 
Indian fathers without physical custody are not automatically excluded from the ICWA’s 
protections.12 This would ensure that courts consider tribal interests in Indian children, Indian 
fathers’ interests, and Indian children’s interest in relation to their tribes and families. 
States’ application of the ICWA has varied since its enactment in 1978.13 Prior to 
Holyfield, state courts limited the ICWA’s application to instances where there was an existing 
Indian family.14 In overturning the existing Indian family doctrine, state courts employed 
Holyfield to determine that the ICWA applied in any child custody proceeding involving an 
Indian child.15 By positioning the pre-existing custody requirement between the stringent existing 
Indian family doctrine and the ICWA’s broader application under Holyfield, state courts 
safeguard tribes’ unique interests in Indian children in line with congressional intent.16  
Part II of this Article will provide the historical background to the ICWA, including 
Congress’s enactment of the ICWA, a brief history of the existing Indian family doctrine and 
many state court rejections of the doctrine under Holyfield, and the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Adoptive Couple.17 Part III will demonstrate that the extreme nature of Adoptive 
Couple, where there was no meaningful parent-child relationship, does not mean that when an 
Indian father without physical custody demonstrates efforts to assume parenthood and establish a 
parent-child relationship, there has been no pre-existing custody.18 Part IV will argue that state 
court precedent that evaluated efforts by unwed fathers and state legislation provide bases for 
state courts to continue with a broad application of the ICWA without undermining “continued 
custody.” This Article urges state courts to implement a flexible standard that evaluates efforts by 
the unwed father to assume parenthood in determining whether the ICWA’s pre-existing custody 
requirement has been met. Finally, Part V concludes that the ICWA’s pre-existing custody 
requirement should carry a low burden of proof to ensure that the unique interests of Indian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 34. 
11 See id. 
12 See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558. The Court found that the biological father in Adoptive Couple “made no meaningful 
attempts to assume his responsibility of parenthood” because the biological father provided no financial support to the birth mother 
during her pregnancy or to the baby girl after her birth, the biological father sent a text message to the birth mother indicating he 
relinquished his parental rights, and the biological father had no contact with the baby girl until she was twenty-seven months old 
when the South Carolina Family Court awarded the biological father custody of the baby girl. Id. at 2558–59 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The facts that the Court relied on to find the father made no attempts to assume parenthood suggests that where an unwed 
non-physical custodial Indian father makes such efforts, such as providing financial assistance and visiting his child, demonstrate the 
father has made meaningful steps to accept the responsibility of parenthood. See id.; see id. at 2578–79 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
Justice Sotomayor suggests that based on the majority’s interpretation of the ICWA, a biological Indian father “who, though he has 
never had custody of his biological child, visits her and pays all of his support obligations” would not be protected by the ICWA 
because he is a non-physical custodial parent. Id. Thus, it follows that a father who visits his child and pays his support obligations 
should receive the ICWA’s protections. See id. 
13 See Dan Lewerenz & Padraic McCoy, The End of the “Existing Indian Family” Jurisprudence: Holyfield at 20, in the Matter of 
A.J.S. and the Last Gasps of a Dying Doctrine, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 684, 695–96, 701 (2010).  
14 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643, P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 542 (Kan. 2009).  
15 See, e.g., Jared P. v. Glade T., 209 P.3d 157, 160 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). 
16	  See, e.g., Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966, 974 (Alaska 2011) (“ICWA applies to any proceeding that might result in the termination 
of a parent-child relationship involving an Indian child.”); 124 CONG. REC. 38,101–03 (1978). 
17 See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); see Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552; see also Jared P., 209 
P.3d at 160 (interpreting Holyfield to reject the existing Indian family doctrine). 
18 See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2572–73, 2576, 2578 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) (noting that the majority’s decision, which was 
based on highly-contested facts, makes the ICWA’s protections inapplicable to any Indian parent who never had custody even if the 
parent made efforts to have a parent-child relationship); but cf. id. at 2558–62 (majority opinion) (noting that the unwed father made 
no effort toward accepting parenthood so there was no pre-existing custody). 
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tribes, Indian fathers, and Indian children are adequately considered in child custody 
proceedings.19   
 
II. THE ICWA ON INDIAN CHILDREN ADOPTIONS TO DATE 
 
A. Background of the ICWA 
During the mid-1970s, the crisis of Indian children being removed from their homes 
through abusive and culturally-insensitive welfare practices gained Congress’s attention.20 
Enacted in 1978, the ICWA was “the result of over [four] years of congressional hearings, 
oversight, and investigation,” which involved hundreds of witnesses testifying on adoption and 
foster care practices regarding Indian children, statistical evidence of the rate of removal for 
Indian children, and reports detailing high numbers of Indian children removed from their homes 
by non-tribal, governmental agencies.21 Congressional inquiries into the problem revealed “25 
percent of all Indian children [were] removed from their homes and placed in some foster care or 
adoptive home or institution.”22 Further, the Association on American Indian Affairs’ survey 
results from July 1976 demonstrated that the removal of Indian children from their homes 
occurred at a much higher rate than for non-Indian children.23 The findings showed that in 
Arizona, for example, “1 out of every 29 Indian children is placed for adoption as compared to 1 
out of 134 non-Indians.”24 In Wisconsin, “1 out of 14 [Indian children is placed for adoption] as 
compared to 1 out of 251 [non-Indian children].”25 Alarmingly, the survey further found that “in 
some States as high as 95 percent of these children are placed in non-Indian foster or adoptive 
homes or institutions.”26 Through its investigation, Congress concluded that the primary cause of 
the crisis was non-tribal; it was the willful or inadvertent cultural insensitivity of governmental 
agencies.27 The congressional record shows that witnesses repeatedly testified about the “failure 
or inability of State agencies, courts, and procedures to fairly consider the differing cultural and 
social norms in Indian communities and families.”28 Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi 
Band of Choctaw Indians, testified before the U.S. House of Representatives that the government 
agents removing Indian children from their homes “[had] no basis for intelligently evaluating the 
cultural and social premises underlying Indian home life and child rearing.”29 The evidence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32–37.  
20 Id. at 32; Brief for Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6, Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-399) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v2/12-
399_amicus_current_former_congress_members.authcheckdam.pdf.  
21 124 CONG. REC. 38,101 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall). 
22 Id. at 38,102. 
23 Id. (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino).  
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Id. (statements of Rep. Udall & Rep. Lagomarsino) (“The most distressing and critical factor giving rise to this emerging crisis of 
Indian families has been the inability or unwillingness of State agencies or officials to understand the different cultural and social 
norms prevailing in the Indian world. . . . The reasons behind these statistics go beyond the general poverty prevalent in many Indian 
communities. Hearing witnesses reiterate time and again the failure or inability of State agencies, courts, and procedures to fairly 
consider the differing cultural and social norms in Indian communities and families.”) 
28 Id. (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino).  
29 Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs & Pub. Lands of the H. Comm. on 
Interior & Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 191–92 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Hearings] (statement of Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Miss. 
Band of Choctaw Indians and Member of the Nat’l Tribal Chairman’s Ass’n), available at 
http://www.narf.org/icwa/federal/lh/hear020978/hear020978.pdf; see also Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 20, at 9–11 (discussing state 
agencies’ failure to consider tribes’ interests in Indian children and Indian children’s interest in preserving a relationship with their 
tribe). 
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before Congress demonstrated that instead of tribes or Indian families deciding the placement and 
future of Indian children, government agents, who were “at best ignorant of [tribes’] cultural 
values, and at worst contemptful of the Indian way,” were making these critical decisions.30 The 
result was that the majority of Indian children were placed in non-Indian homes—removed from 
the tribe, the child’s Indian family, and Indian culture.31 
Upon examination, Congress recognized the significant impact that the removal of Indian 
children had on tribal ability to continue Indian heritage and self-governance.32 Fay La Pointe, a 
leader in the Puyallup Tribe of Indians, testified before Congress stating, “[w]e know that our 
children are our greatest resource, and without them we have no future.”33 Calvin Issac’s 
testimony further emphasizes the importance of Indian children to their tribes.34 He stated that 
Indian children are the “only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage,” and that as 
the majority of Indian children removed from their homes were placed in non-Indian families, 
these children were “denied exposure to the ways of their People,” and tribes were denied the 
opportunity to raise children within the tribal culture.35 He lamented that this severely limited the 
continuance of tribal heritage.36  
The congressional record indicates the denial of the transmission of Indian culture by 
non-tribal government agents “constitute[d] a serious threat to [tribes’] existence as on-going, 
self-governing communities.”37 Not only did the removal of Indian children from their families 
and subsequent placement in non-Indian homes result in the inability of these Indian children to 
learn their tribal culture and limit their ability to take on future leadership positions within their 
tribes, but such practices also undercut tribal ability to care for their members and threatened 
tribal sovereignties.38 The non-tribal agents’ removal of Indian children from their tribes and 
families disregarded tribal sovereignty and resulted in detriment to Indian family relationships 
and the continuance of Indian heritage, further undermining tribal ability to self-govern through 
the “wholesale removal of [Indian] children.”39 Further, there were few, if any, opportunities for 
tribes to intervene or to provide cultural insight in custody decisions regarding Indian children 
because, as the congressional record notes, “[g]enerally, there [were] no requirements for 
responsible tribal authorities to be consulted about or even informed of child removal actions by 
nontribal government or private agents.”40   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 1978 Hearings, supra note 29, at 192 (statement of Calvin Isaac). 
31 Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. 318 (1977) 
[hereinafter 1977 Hearings] (statement of Howard E. Tommie, Chairman of the Nat’l Indian Health Bd.), available at 
http://www.narf.org/icwa/federal/lh/hear080477/hear080477.pdf. Howard E. Tommie testified on statistics from the Association on 
American Indian Affairs, stating that in 1975, “in North Dakota, [seventy-five percent] of those Indian children in foster care were 
placed with non-Indian families. In Montana, the figure rose to [eighty-seven percent] and in California, which has the third highest 
Indian population of any state in the nation, the figure reached [ninety-three percent].” Id. 
32 124 CONG. REC. 38,102 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall) (“Indian tribes and Indian people are being drained of their children and, 
as a result, their future as a tribe and a people is being placed in jeopardy. . . . What resource is more critical to an Indian tribe than its 
children? What is more vital to the tribes’ future than its children?”). 
33 1978 Hearings, supra note 29, at 78 (testimony of Fay La Pointe, a Puyallup tribe leader); see also Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 
20, at 9 (quoting Fay La Pointe’s testimony before Congress at the 1978 Hearings to argue that Congress enacted the ICWA to protect 
tribes’ interests in their children). 
34 1978 Hearings, supra note 29, at 193 (statement of Calvin Isaac). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 124 CONG. REC. 38,103 (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino). 
38 See 1978 Hearings, supra note 29, at 193 (statement of Calvin Isaac).  
39 124 CONG. REC. 38,103 (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino); see also 1978 Hearings, supra note 29, at 192–93 (statement of Calvin 
Isaac) (describing the negative impact the removal of Indian children has on tribes’ members, including drug abuse and suicide).   
40 124 CONG. REC. 38,102 (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino).  
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The congressional record also demonstrates that Congress recognized Indian children’s 
interest in being raised in their tribal community. Although speaking specifically about unborn 
Indian children, Fay La Pointe from the Puyallup Tribe of Indians acknowledged Indian 
children’s interests in being raised within the tribal culture, which includes the child’s “right to 
know where he/she is from . . . the tribe of his/her ancestors.”41 Further evidence presented to 
Congress demonstrated that being raised in non-Indian households negatively impacted Indian 
children.42 Expert testimony indicated that being raised outside of Indian culture resulted in 
Indian children, particularly during adolescence, having difficulty in forming a cultural identity 
resulting in negative behavior, such as runaway problems and suicide attempts.43 These 
difficulties were compounded by the separation of Indian children from their extended Indian 
families as the children formed their cultural identity.44 Evidence from both professionals and 
Indian leaders as to the negative effects faced by Indian children raised in non-Indian households 
led Congress to determine that being raised outside of tribal communities “[does] not meet 
[Indian children’s] special cultural needs.”45 Further, Congress recognized that being raised 
outside of tribal communities denied Indian children their “right to share in the cultural and 
property benefits of membership in [their] tribe.”46 
Congress further acknowledged the negative effects on Indian parents and their families 
caused by the removal of their children and the significant interests that Indian parents and their 
families had in raising their Indian children.47 The congressional record indicates that the removal 
of Indian children negatively impacts Indian parents by lowering the parents’ self-esteem and 
exacerbating already existing issues, like alcohol abuse.48 Evidence presented to Congress also 
suggested that Indian parents often did not understand their rights in custody proceedings.49 The 
evidence further indicated that non-tribal agents did not understand Indian family relationships 
that extend beyond the nuclear family and often refused to place Indian children with tribal 
families.50 In recognizing that Indian parents experience negative effects from the removal of 
their children and often do not understand their rights, Congress acknowledged the interests that 
Indian parents and Indian families had in raising Indian children in order to pass on their 
culture.51 Clearly, the ICWA was enacted to promote the interests of Indian tribes, Indian 
children, and Indian parents. 
B. Mandates 
The ICWA was passed to remedy the crisis of the large-scale removal of Indian children 
from their families in order to protect the interests of Indian parents and families, alongside the 
interests of the tribes in their children and the interests of the Indian children in their tribes.52 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 1978 Hearings, supra note 29, at 79 (statement of Fay La Pointe).  
42 See Indian Child Welfare Program Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the S. Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 
93d Cong. 49 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Hearings] (statement of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer, Dep’t of Psychiatry, Univ. of Minn.)), 
available at http://www.narf.org/icwa/federal/lh/hear040874/hear040874.pdf. 
43 See id. at 45–49. 
44 See id. Extended families would traditionally be “counted as close, responsible members of [Indian children’s] famil[ies]” when 
Indian children are raised within their tribes. 1977 Hearings, supra note 31, at 316 (statement of Howard E. Tommie). 
45 124 CONG. REC. 38,102–03 (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino). 
46 Id. at 38,103.  
47 See id.  
48 Id.  
49 See 1978 Hearings, supra note 29, at 201 (statement of Mona Shephard, Coordinator, RST Social Servs. Program, Rosebud Sioux 
Tribe, Rosebud, S.D.).  
50 See 1977 Hearings, supra note 31, at 316 (statement of Howard E. Tommie). 
51 See id. at 320–21; see 1978 Hearings, supra note 29, at 201 (statement of Mona Shephard); see also Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 
20, at 9–11 (arguing that Congress recognized the negative impact the removal of Indian children had on tribes and enacted the ICWA 
to protect tribes’ interests in their children). 
52 See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32–37 (1989); 124 CONG. REG. 38,101–03 (1978).  
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congressional record demonstrates that Congress saw as its “responsibility” to remedy the crisis 
by “assist[ing] tribes in protecting their most precious resource, their children.”53 Thus, the 
congressional declaration of policy behind the ICWA states, “it is the policy of this Nation to 
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian 
tribes and families.”54 Congress, therefore, specifically identifies interests of Indian tribes and 
families in the language of the ICWA, indicating that the purpose of the ICWA is to protect 
Indian tribes and families alongside Indian children.55  
Of particular importance is the ICWA’s provision recognizing heightened protections of 
the parental rights of Indian parents. Regarding the termination of parental rights, § 1912(f) 
provides that “[n]o termination of parental rights may be ordered in the absence of a 
determination . . . that the continued custody of the child by the parent . . . is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”56 The ICWA further provides that “[a]ny 
party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian 
child under State law . . . [undertake] active efforts . . . to prevent the breakup of an Indian family 
. . . .”57 Finally, even if an Indian parent’s parental rights are terminated, § 1915(a) provides that 
“[i]n any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in 
the absence of good cause to the contrary, to placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended 
family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”58 These ICWA 
provisions demonstrate congressional intent to ensure that the relationships between Indian 
parents and their children are protected and, importantly, that tribal relationships with Indian 
children are protected.59 
Although a federal statute, state courts apply the ICWA in their own unique ways 
because the ICWA is applied in child custody proceedings, such as adoptions or terminations of 
parental rights, which occur in state courts.60 The ICWA anticipated some state law standards for 
adoption proceedings involving Indian children.61 States’ application of the ICWA has varied 
because the ICWA sets minimum, not maximum, standards for states to apply in custody 
proceedings involving Indian children.62  
C. Precedents 
1. The Pre-2013 U.S. Supreme Court Precedent 
In 1989, the Supreme Court issued its first decision applying the ICWA in Mississippi 
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.63 Although the case presented a jurisdictional issue, 
causing the Court not to decide the outcome of the custody proceeding regarding two Indian 
children, the Court’s analysis of the ICWA confirmed that the purpose of the ICWA was to 
protect the interests of not only Indian families and children, but also tribal interests in Indian 
children.64 Relying on the congressional findings emphasizing the negative impact felt by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 124 CONG. REC. 38,103 (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino). 
54 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2012). 
55 Id.  
56 Id. § 1912(f) (2012). 
57 Id. § 1912(d). 
58 Id. § 1915(a) (2012). 
59 See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 20, at 6–8.  
60 See In re N.B., 199 P.3d 16, 18–19 (Colo. App. 2007) (providing a background of states’ different applications of the ICWA). 
61 See id. at 18 (noting that the ICWA sets “minimum standards for the removal of Indian children,” thereby leaving room for state 
courts to set higher standards).  
62 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2012). If a state chooses to do so, it may set higher standards than the federal standards established by the ICWA. 
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 40.1 (West 2015) (explicitly providing that Indian tribes have an interest in Indian children, 
“regardless of whether or not said children are in the physical custody of an Indian parent or Indian custodian . . . .”). 
63 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
64 Id. at 37, 53. 
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tribes from the removal of Indian children, the Court emphasized that Indian tribes have a 
“unique and compelling interest” in Indian children, which Congress sought to protect through 
provisions of the ICWA.65 These protections included jurisdictional provisions giving tribal 
courts authority over Indian child custody proceedings, requiring notice to tribes when custody 
proceedings took place in state courts, and preferring placements of Indian children with Indian 
families.66 The Court concluded that the ICWA stood “to protect the rights of the Indian child as 
an Indian and the rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its 
society.”67 Holyfield, therefore, confirmed that in custody proceedings involving Indian children, 
the ICWA applied in order to ensure that the interests of the Indian child, family, and tribe were 
considered.68 
2. The Pre-2013 State Court Precedents 
Although the Supreme Court did not make its first ruling on the ICWA until 1989, state 
courts were applying and interpreting the ICWA in Indian child custody proceedings since the 
ICWA’s enactment in 1978.69 Prior to the Court’s Holyfield decision, many state courts had been 
applying the existing Indian family doctrine when applying the ICWA to Indian child custody 
proceedings.70 The existing Indian family doctrine, first established by the Kansas Supreme Court 
in In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., “is a judicially created exception to the ICWA for factual 
situations when the minor has never been a member of an Indian home or exposed to Indian 
culture.”71 In reaching this conclusion, the Kansas court relied on language from the ICWA that 
emphasizes the ICWA’s purpose of protecting Indian families, including language about 
preventing the “breakup of the Indian family.”72 The Kansas court concluded that the ICWA set 
protections for Indian children and families in “the removal of Indian children from an existing 
Indian family unit.”73 Other state courts soon followed so that the ICWA’s application in Indian 
child custody proceedings was limited to cases where an existing Indian family could be 
established.74  
Following Holyfield, however, state courts began to overrule the existing Indian family 
doctrine75 on the premise that the ICWA stood for protecting more than an existing Indian 
family.76 Later courts found that the ICWA also stood to protect the unique interests of the tribe 
in its children so that the ICWA applied in any custody proceeding where the child was an Indian 
child.77 In rejecting the existing Indian family doctrine, state courts further found that the ICWA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Id. at 34–37; see Lewerenz & McCoy, supra note 13, at 698. 
66 Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 35–37; see Lewerenz & McCoy, supra note 13, at 698. 
67 Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 23 (1978)).  
68 Id. at 34–37.  
69 See, e.g., Lewerenz & McCoy, supra note 13, at 686–97. 
70 See generally id. (providing a more thorough analysis of the existing Indian family doctrine and states’ adoption, rejection, and in 
some instances, revocation of the doctrine).  
71 In re Alexandria P., 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 484 (Ct. App. 2014), reh’g denied, (Sept. 4, 2014), review denied, (Oct. 29, 2014); see 
also In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982) (establishing the existing Indian family doctrine), overruled by In 
re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009).  
72 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2012); In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175–76. 
73 In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175–76; 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d); see also Lewerenz & McCoy, supra note 13, at 694–95 (providing a 
more thorough explanation the Kansas Supreme Court’s adoption of the existing Indian family doctrine). 
74 See, e.g., Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650, 654 (S.D. 1987); see also Lewerenz & McCoy, supra note 13, at 686–87, 702–12 
(providing a more thorough explanation of other states’ subsequent adoptions of the existing Indian family doctrine and an analysis of 
states’ justifications of the doctrine following Holyfield).  
75 In overturning the existing Indian family doctrine post-Holyfield, the Kansas Supreme Court noted that “[t]he majority of our sister 
states who have considered the existing Indian family doctrine have rejected it.” In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 548 (Kan. 2009); see also 
In re Alexandria P., 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 484 (noting that many state courts have repudiated the existing Indian family doctrine).  
76 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489–90 (S.D. 1990). 
77 Id. 
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also protected Indian children’s interests in their relationships with their tribes, families, and 
culture.78 For example, a Colorado Appellate Court found that a parent is unable to “unilaterally 
determin[e] that the Indian child will not be raised in an Indian home and will not participate in 
Indian culture.”79 In reaching this decision, the court relied on Holyfield’s “recognition of the 
tribes’ interests in Indian children as well as the interests of the Indian children themselves.”80 
Thus, Congress’s intent, alongside Holyfield’s acknowledgment of the unique interests of tribes in 
Indian children and children’s interests in relationships with their tribe and families, demonstrates 
the ICWA should apply broadly in Indian child custody proceedings.81  
3. The 2013 U.S. Supreme Court Precedent 
After Holyfield, the U.S. Supreme Court next heard a case involving the ICWA in 2013 
in Adoptive Couple. The facts were “hotly contested,” suggesting to some that Adoptive Couple 
represents an extreme case.82 The case involved an unwed biological Cherokee father seeking 
custody of his baby girl, who was in the process of being adopted by a couple selected by the 
non-Indian birth mother.83 When the birth mother informed the biological father she was 
pregnant, the two were engaged; however, their relationship dissolved shortly thereafter.84 The 
birth mother then sent the biological father a text message asking if he would prefer to pay child 
support or relinquish his parental rights.85 The biological father responded by text message that he 
would prefer to relinquish his parental rights.86 The birth mother subsequently selected the 
adoptive couple through a private adoption agency.87 The biological father provided no financial 
support to the birth mother or the baby girl throughout the pregnancy or in the months following 
the baby girl’s birth.88 When the baby girl was about four months old, the biological father was 
served with notice of a proposed adoption in a South Carolina state court and signed papers 
stating that he would not contest the adoption; however, he asserted that at the time, he believed 
he was relinquishing his parental rights to the birth mother.89 One day after signing, the biological 
father contacted a lawyer and then requested a stay of the adoption proceedings, stating he did not 
consent to the adoption and sought custody of the baby girl.90  
The South Carolina Family Court awarded the biological father custody of his baby girl 
in September 2011.91 The court reasoned that the adoptive couple did not meet the ICWA’s 
standard on the involuntary termination of a birth father’s parental rights.92 The South Carolina 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 See In re N.B., 199 P.3d 16, 21 (Colo. App. 2007).  
79 Id. at 21. 
80 Id.  
81 See id. 
82 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2576 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
83 Id. at 2558–59 (majority opinion).  
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 2558. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 2558–89. 
91 Id. at 2559. 
92 The South Carolina Family Court relied upon § 1912(f) of the ICWA. Id. Section 1912(f) states that:  
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a 
determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert 
witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the child.  
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2012).  
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Supreme Court affirmed, relying in part on the ICWA to find that “active efforts” had not been 
made to prevent the breakup of an Indian family.93  
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed that decision. In its review of the facts, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the biological father had “made no meaningful attempts to assume his 
responsibility of parenthood”94 so that § 1912(f) of the ICWA did not apply. The Court reasoned 
that “the continued custody of the child by the parent” in § 1912(f) placed a condition on the 
application of the ICWA’s heightened protections for terminating parental rights.95 The Court 
concluded that the phrase indicated there must be a “pre-existing state,” so that the Indian parent 
must currently have or have had custody of the child for there to be “pre-existing custody” in 
order for § 1912(f) to apply.96 The Court reasoned that the biological father “never had custody” 
of the baby girl because he failed to provide financial support to the birth mother during her 
pregnancy and after the baby girl’s birth, he indicated that he relinquished his parental rights, and 
he never had physical custody of the child.97 The Court held that where, as in this case, a non-
Indian parent with sole custody of the child voluntarily initiates lawful adoption proceedings and 
the Indian parent “never had custody of the Indian child,” the ICWA’s standard that parental 
rights cannot be terminated absent a showing “that continued custody of the child by the parent 
. . . is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child”98 did not apply, since 
there is no pre-existing custody to evaluate.99 Therefore, the Court held the heightened burden 
under the ICWA on involuntary parental rights terminations did not apply.100  
The Court also analyzed the application of § 1912(d), which requires that “active efforts” 
be made to “prevent the breakup of the Indian family” before parental rights to an Indian child are 
terminated.101 The Court concluded that the provisions of §§ 1912(d) and 1912(f) were “adjacent” 
so that the phrase “breakup of the Indian family” indicated that there must be a relationship 
between the Indian child and Indian parent before § 1912(d) can be applied.102 In other words, 
there must also be “pre-existing custody” to evaluate in order for § 1912(d) to apply.103 The Court 
reasoned that because the biological father never had physical or legal custody of the baby girl 
and had no prior contact with the baby girl, there was no family relationship between the 
biological father and the baby girl that would be disturbed, so § 1912(d) did not apply.104  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 In addition to § 1912(f) of the ICWA, the South Carolina Supreme Court also relied on § 1912(d) to find that the ICWA barred the 
termination of Biological Father’s parental rights. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2559. Section 1912(d) states that: 
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian 
child under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and 
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved 
unsuccessful.  
25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). Further, the South Carolina Supreme Court found that even if the biological father’s parental 
rights were terminated, adoption preferences under § 1915(a) would apply. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2559. 
Section 1915(a) of the ICWA states: 
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in the 
absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended family; (2) 
other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.  
25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2012).  
94 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558. 
95 Id. at 2560 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)).  
96 Id. at 2561–62. 
97 Id. at 2558, 2560–62. 
98 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). 
99 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2561–62. 
100 Id. at 2562. 
101 Id. at 2562–64 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d)) (analyzing § 1912(d) and its application as to the unwed, non-physical custodial Indian 
father). 
102 Id. at 2562–63. 
103 Id. at 2561–63.  
104 Id. at 2562. 
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Further, the Court held, “§ 1915(a)’s preferences are inapplicable in cases where no 
alternative party has formally sought to adopt the child. This is because there simply is no 
‘preference’ to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has 
come forward.”105 Additionally, the Court stressed that “Baby Girl’s paternal grandparents never 
sought custody of Baby Girl. . . . Nor did other members of the Cherokee Nation or ‘other Indian 
families’ seek to adopt Baby Girl, even though the Cherokee Nation had notice of—and 
intervened—in the adoption proceeding.”106 The significance the Court placed on the fact that 
neither the child’s paternal Indian grandparents nor other members of the Cherokee Nation sought 
to adopt the child indicates that had such parties sought to adopt the child, the ICWA’s preference 
under § 1915(a) would have applied as either of these parties would provide an alternative party 
eligible for the ICWA’s preference.107 The reasoning in Adoptive Couple suggests that in cases 
where tribal members seek to adopt an Indian child, the ICWA’s § 1915(a) preferences apply.108  
The 2013 U.S. Supreme Court precedent has prompted differing readings. In its 2014 
decision, the California Court of Appeals applied a flexible interpretation of Adoptive Couple, 
holding in In re Alexandria P. that where a couple has been “identified as prospective adoptive 
parents” and “are considered extended family by the tribe,” Adoptive Couple does not apply and 
the couple is entitled to § 1915(a) preferences.109 In contrast, the Supreme Court of Alaska, in its 
2014 decision, Native Village of Tununak v. Alaska Department of Health and Social Services, 
held that the tribe’s mere production of contact information for a potential placement was 
insufficient to invoke § 1915(a) preferences.110 Rather, the Alaska Supreme Court found that 
Adoptive Couple requires a “formal step to adopt the child” for § 1915(a) preferences to apply.111 
Such a strict interpretation of Adoptive Couple, however, greatly limits the ICWA’s protections to 
the detriment of tribes.112 In his dissent, Alaskan Justice Winfree detailed the obstacles rural tribal 
relatives face when filing for the formal adoption of an Indian child, including lack of access to 
the legal system, difficulty knowing when an urban Indian child is involved in a custody 
proceeding, and difficulty knowing when a non-Indian family has filed a formal adoption petition 
for an Indian child.113 Because strict application of Adoptive Couple requiring a formal adoption 
petition to invoke the ICWA’s preferences “will have disastrous results” for tribes, a flexible 
approach, such as that applied by the California Court of Appeals, is needed to protect tribes’ 
interests in Indian children.114 Thus the ICWA’s § 1915(a) preferences should apply wherever 
members of the tribe are identified as prospective parents.115  
Adoptive Couple could also be read to add an additional requirement for an Indian 
parent—particularly an unwed biological Indian father—to meet before the ICWA’s protections 
apply.116 The Court’s interpretation of the ICWA’s “continued custody” could be said to mandate 
that an Indian parent must establish “pre-existing custody,” meaning physical custody, before 
either §§ 1912(f) or 1912(d) apply to the custody proceedings.117 Such a pre-existing custody 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Id. at 2564. 
106 Id. 
107 See id.  
108 See id.  
109 In re Alexandria P., 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 486 (Ct. App. 2014).  
110 Native Vill. of Tununak v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 334 P.3d 165, 177 (Alaska 2014).  
111 Id. at 172.   
112 Id. at 182 (Winfree, J., dissenting). 
113 Id.   
114 Id. at 172; see In re Alexandria P., 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 486. 
115 See Native Vill. of Tununak, 334 P.3d at 183 (Winfree, J., dissenting). 
116 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2561–63 (2013). 
117 See id.  
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requirement, however, has the potential to exclude many unwed biological Indian fathers; rather 
courts should read Adoptive Couple differently and enable unwed biological Indian fathers to 
establish pre-existing custody through demonstrations of such efforts to accept the responsibilities 
of parenthood.118 Efforts to accept the responsibility of parenthood could include: prior contact 
with the child (or attempted contact) that creates (or would have created) a relationship between 
the father and child or providing (or trying to provide) financial support during the mother’s 
pregnancy and after the child’s birth, so as to recognize a birth mother may thwart a biological 
father’s efforts partially or fully.119 This reading of the pre-existing custody requirement is 
supported by the Court’s notation in Adoptive Couple regarding the tribe not seeking to adopt, 
when also it found the unwed father had no pre-existing custody. 
Justice Sotomayor characterized the facts the majority relied upon as “hotly contested,” 
suggesting Adoptive Couple was an extreme case that should be read narrowly.120 A narrow 
interpretation of Adoptive Couple recognizes an additional burden within the ICWA in custody 
proceedings involving an Indian child, but does not severally limit the ICWA’s application. As 
Justice Breyer points out in his concurrence, the Court concluded that the biological father in 
Adoptive Couple was an “absentee Indian father who had next-to-no involvement with his 
child,”121 suggesting only that this particular unwed father was outside the scope of the ICWA, 
but not that the ICWA itself should be greatly limited so as to preclude participation of any 
unwed biological fathers and their tribes in Indian child custody cases.122   
While the determinative facts the majority used offer an example of when the pre-
existing custody requirement of the ICWA has not been met, Adoptive Couple is an extreme case 
and should not be read to establish a high burden for meeting the pre-existing custody 
requirement of the ICWA. Rather, Adoptive Couple, given congressional goals, should be read to 
leave room for state courts to set minimum standards for meeting the pre-existing custody 
requirement without a showing of prior custody. On a spectrum of cases on whether the ICWA 
applies, Adoptive Couple is situated at the far end. This view of Adoptive Couple coincides with 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence where he states that the case “should decide . . . no more than is 
necessary.”123 Justice Breyer’s concurrence recognizes the facts in Adoptive Couple as extreme. 
Justice Breyer opines that the ICWA’s broad scope is not severally limited because the majority’s 
decision is limited to the special facts.124 This suggests state courts are in a position to ensure the 
ICWA’s broad application in Indian child custody proceedings by looking to all parenting efforts 
by the unwed father in determining whether the pre-existing custody requirement is met.125 In 
reaching its decision that the unwed father did not meet the pre-existing custody requirement, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 See id. at 2558. The Court concluded that because the father provided no financial assistance to the child, indicated he relinquished 
his parental rights, and had no prior contact with the child, the father “made no meaningful attempts to assume his responsibility of 
parenthood.” Id. at 2558–59 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
119 Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring); cf. id. at 2558 (majority opinion) (considering efforts the father did not make to conclude there 
was no parent-child relationship). In his concurrence, Justice Breyer notes the “case does not involve a father with visitation rights or a 
father who has paid all of his child support obligations. . . . Neither does it involve special circumstances such as a father who was 
deceived about the existence of the child or a father who was prevented from supporting his child.” Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted). Thus, Justice Breyer’s concurrence suggests where a father has made such efforts; the ICWA’s protections may 
apply. See id.  
120 Id. at 2576 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
121 Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
122 See id. 
123 Id. 
124 See id.  
125 See id. at 2558 (majority opinion) (noting that this was not a case where there was visitation between the father and child or a case 
where the father provided financial support to his child; supporting the argument that where the father makes such parental efforts, 
pre-existing custody is established); see In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489 (S.D. 1990) (providing an example of a state 
court broadly applying the ICWA). 
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majority in Adoptive Couple looked to the unwed father’s relinquishment of his parental rights 
and failure to provide financial support.126 Congressional policies demonstrate that Adoptive 
Couple should be read narrowly so as to limit the ICWA’s application only in extreme cases 
where the unwed father failed to assume, or failed to try to assume, the responsibility of 
parenthood and where the tribe also did not seek adoption.127 Therefore, an unwed father should 
meet the pre-existing custody requirement so long as he demonstrates affirmative actions to take 
on parenthood, though short of physical custody.128  
A narrow reading of Adoptive Couple enables state courts to set minimum standards as to 
what actions undertaken by unwed fathers are sufficient to fulfill the pre-existing custody 
requirement.129 For example, state courts could take into consideration whether the unwed father 
visited and supported the birth mother during pregnancy, or visited and had some relationship 
with the child, short of physical custody.130 State courts could also take into consideration any 
factors that limited the unwed father in taking on parenthood, as with an unwed father who in 
good faith did not know he had a child.131 Such readings of the ICWA would align unwed 
biological Indian fathers in circumstances similar to the circumstances of non-Indian unwed 
biological fathers, who under Lehr v. Robertson, who need to step up to parenthood in order to 
secure federal constitutional childrearing interests in adoption proceedings.132 
 
III. STATE COURT PRECEDENTS 
 
A. In re Adoption of Baby Girl B. 
Prior to Holyfield under the ICWA, state courts looked to parent-like efforts by the 
unwed Indian father, where the father did not have physical custody, in order to determine 
whether there was an existing Indian family.133 For example, in the case of In re Adoption of Baby 
Girl B., the Court of Civil Appeals in Oklahoma concluded that the unwed father’s lack of 
custody did not bar the heightened protections of §§ 1912(e) and (f) of the ICWA because the 
father did not receive reasonable notice of parenthood and did not waive any right to seek custody 
so that he was a non-custodial parent through no fault of his own.134 In re Adoption of Baby Girl 
B. supports the proposition that when the unwed father is a non-physical custodial parent through 
no fault of his own, he should not be excluded from the ICWA protections.135 Considering such 
factors as lack of reasonable notice of parenthood to the unwed father ensures that the father’s 
interests are protected and safeguards the unique interests of tribes that the ICWA was designed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558. 
127 See infra Part II.A–B; see Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2578–79 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 2558, 2561–62, 2564 
(majority opinion) (finding where the father provided no financial support and relinquished his parental rights there was no pre-
existing custody, so § 1912(f)’s preferences did not apply and finding where the tribe did not seek to adopt the child, § 1915(a)’s 
preferences were inapplicable). 
128 See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2578–79 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 2558–59 (majority opinion) (noting that the father 
failed to provide financial support, relinquished his parental rights, and had no contact with the child after her birth). 
129 Cf. id. at 2558, 2560–61 (majority opinion) (looking at the father’s failure to have a parent-child relationship when determining 
there was no pre-existing custody).  
130 See id. at 2573, 2578 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that parents who have established emotional ties, visit their children, and 
provide financial support should receive the ICWA’s protections). 
131 Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
132 See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261–62 (1983). 
133 See In re Adoption of Baby Girl B., 67 P.3d 359, 365–66 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003). 
134 Id. The unwed father did not know about his child until he received notice when the adoption proceedings between the adoptive 
parents and birth mother began. Id. He then took steps to establish his paternity. Id. at 366. 
135 See id. at 365–66; see also Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Neither does [the case] involve special 
circumstances such as a father who was deceived about the existence of the child or a father who was prevented from supporting his 
child.”). 
12
Children's Legal Rights Journal, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 4
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj/vol35/iss1/4
2015]                               The ICWA’s Pre-Existing Custody Requirement                                    37             37 
	  
	  
to protect.136 Thus, when analyzing whether an unwed father has established custody sufficient to 
evaluate “continued custody,”137 so that the ICWA’s heightened protections regarding termination 
of parental rights apply, state courts should consider such factors as the unwed father’s 
knowledge of the child’s existence and thus whether the unwed father had a reasonable 
opportunity to take on parenthood.138 A non-physical custodial Indian father should not be 
automatically excluded from the ICWA’s protections.139  
B. In re Adoption of Baade 
Prior to 2013 and after Holyfield, the majority of state courts applied the ICWA’s 
heightened protections to any custody proceeding involving an Indian child.140 One example is In 
re Adoption of Baade.141 There, the Supreme Court of South Dakota established the standard that 
the “ICWA’s application to a case is only contingent upon whether an ‘Indian child’ is the subject 
of a ‘child custody proceeding.’”142 Earlier, the Supreme Court of South Dakota had established 
the existing Indian family doctrine in Claymore v. Serr,143 which held that the ICWA’s 
application was dependent upon the Indian child being a part of an existing Indian family.144 The 
court’s decision in In re Baade is noteworthy because it overturns the existing Indian family 
doctrine by applying Holyfield.145 The court reasoned that Holyfield’s finding that the ICWA was 
also intended to “protect . . . the rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children 
in its society”146 required state courts to look beyond the interests of an existing Indian family in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 See In re Baby Girl B., 67 P.3d at 365–66; see Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34–37 (1989). 
137 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2012); see also id. § 1912(d) (requiring that “active efforts” must have been made “to prevent the breakup of 
the Indian family”). The Court concluded that like “continued custody,” “breakup of the Indian family” indicates that there must be a 
relationship between the unwed Indian father and the child for the court to evaluate. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560 (majority 
opinion). 
138 See In re Baby Girl B., 67 P.3d at 365–66; Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
139 See In re Baby Girl B., 67 P.3d at 366; Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2578 n.8 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting); cf. id. at 2558–59 (majority opinion) (relying on the father’s indication that he relinquished his parental rights among 
other facts to conclude that the father did not have pre-existing custody, which suggests that where a father does not take such an 
affirmative step, pre-existing custody may exist and the ICWA may apply).  
140 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 490 (S.D. 1990). 
141 Id.  
142 Id. (referring to the terms in the ICWA). Section 1903(4) of the ICWA defines an “Indian child” as “any unmarried person who is 
under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the 
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012). Section 1903(1) further provides that a custody 
proceeding includes: foster care placements, termination of parental rights, preadoptive placements, and adoptive placements. 25 
U.S.C. § 1903(1) (defining further foster care placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, and adoptive 
placement as individual terms).  
143 Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650, 654 (S.D. 1987). 
144 Id. at 653–54. In defining family, the South Dakota Supreme Court applied a narrow definition of family. The court held that 
family within the context of the ICWA, was restricted to the nuclear family. Id. at 653. This reasoning fails to recognize the emphasis 
Congress placed on tribal culture, where an Indian child may have a close relationship with extended family members, who could 
provide care to the child while maintaining the child’s relationship with the tribal community. By considering testimony regarding the 
support extended families in tribes provide to raise children, Congress sought to acknowledge tribes’ interests in their children and 
preserve tribes’ existence as self-governing communities. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 31, at 316 (“For example, Indian extended 
families are far larger than non-Indian nuclear families. An Indian child may have scores of, perhaps more than a hundred, relatives 
who are counted as close, responsible members of the family.”); see also Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 20, at 10–11 (arguing the 
legislative history of the ICWA demonstrates Congress’s concern for familial relationships within tribes and that Congress intended to 
protect Indian children’s relationships with their tribes through the ICWA).  
145 In re Baade, 462 N.W.2d at 489–90; see Lewerenz & McCoy, supra note 13 at 717–22 (providing a more-thorough explanation of 
several state courts’ applications of Holyfield to reject the existing Indian family doctrine in favor of a more broad application of the 
ICWA); see Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34–37. In Holyfield, the Supreme Court concluded that “the 
protection of th[e] tribal interest is at the core of the ICWA, which recognizes that the tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct 
from but on a parity with the interest of the parents.” Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 52. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied upon 
hearings and evidence before Congress that emphasized the impact the removal of Indian children had on tribes in their ability to 
continue as self-governing entities. The Court reasoned that through the ICWA, Congress intended to protect tribal interests in their 
children alongside those of the Indian family and child. See id. at 32–37. 
146 Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 23 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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order to “recognize the legitimate concerns of the tribe.”147 As a result, the court concluded that 
the ICWA should be read liberally to apply in any custody proceeding involving an Indian child 
in order to protect the interests of Indian families, children, and tribes.148  
C. Bruce L. v. W.E. 
Following Holyfield and decisions that rejected the existing Indian family doctrine, like 
In re Baade, state courts continued to look to efforts by the unwed father to determine if the 
ICWA applied. In Bruce L. v. W.E.,149 the Supreme Court of Alaska looked to efforts by the 
father in order to determine whether the father had established paternity for the ICWA’s 
application.150 The court also examined the state law issue of whether the unwed father 
communicated and provided financial support and care to the Indian child.151 The court’s analysis 
offers an analogous example of what efforts are necessary for an unwed father to fulfill the ICWA 
pre-existing custody requirement.152 In determining that the unwed father was a parent for 
purposes of the ICWA, the court concluded that the unwed father had made reasonable efforts to 
acknowledge paternity by contesting the adoption at issue in the case and by filing a separate suit 
for custody.153  
While Adoptive Couple provides an example of when the pre-existing custody 
requirement has not been met, the reasonable efforts analysis used by the Bruce L. court provides 
a basis for custody that can be reconciled with Adoptive Couple and allows the court to move 
beyond the extreme facts of Adoptive Couple.154 As state courts apply Adoptive Couple, Bruce L. 
provides a sensible standard that promotes congressional policies. Under Bruce L., courts should 
consider the reasonable efforts toward parenthood made by the unwed father in determining 
whether a flexible pre-existing custody requirement has been met.155 A reasonable-efforts 
standard is consistent with Adoptive Couple by precluding the ICWA’s protections for unwed 
fathers whom the statute was not designed to protect, like fathers who had no involvement or 
interest in their child’s life.156  
The Bruce L. court’s analysis also provides additional insights into the factors that state 
courts could use to determine if the ICWA’s pre-existing custody requirement is met.157 In its 
analysis the court valued a father’s communicating with his child or seeking assistance of the 
courts in communicating in some way when the child is too young to communicate through mail 
or phone.158 Such acts indicate the non-physical custodial unwed Indian father’s interest in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 In re Baade, 462 N.W.2d at 489. 
148 Id. at 489–90. 
149 Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966 (Alaska 2011). 
150 Id. at 979.  
151 Id. Although parental consent is required for adoption in Alaska, a state law does not require parental consent when the non-
custodial parent has unjustifiably failed to communicate with the child for one year or failed to provide care and support to the child. 
Id.   
152 See id.; see also Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2571 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring) (acknowledging that the case 
did not involve a father with visitation rights, who had paid child support, or who was deceived about or prevented from supporting 
his child); cf. id. at 2558 (majority opinion) (providing an example of where there is no pre-existing custody due to the father’s failure 
to make efforts to take on the role of parenthood).  
153 Bruce L., 247 P.3d at 979. 
154 See id.; see also Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558–59, 2561–62 (finding no pre-existing custody where the father made no effort 
to take on the role of parenthood).  
155 See Bruce L., 247 P.3d at 979; see also Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558–59, 2561–62 (establishing the pre-existing custody 
requirement). 
156 See Bruce L., 247 P.3d at 979; see Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2563 n.8; see also id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“First, the 
statute does not directly explain how to treat an absentee Indian father who had next-to-no involvement with his child in the first few 
months of her life. That category of fathers . . . seem[s] to fall outside the scope of the language of 25 U.S.C. §§ 1912(d) and (f). . . . 
Thus, this case does not involve a father with visitation rights or a father who has paid ‘all of his child support obligations.’”).  
157 See Bruce L., 247 P.3d at 979. 
158 Id. at 980–81. 
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preserving his relationship with his child.159 Similarly, an unwed father seeking judicial recourse 
to prove his failure to provide child support was understandable demonstrates the father’s attempt 
to fulfill the role of parenthood. 160 By looking to all efforts by the non-physical custodial father in 
determining whether the father’s consent for the adoption is required, Bruce L. also reinforces the 
idea that the pre-existing custody requirement should not automatically exclude unwed non-
physical custodial fathers from the ICWA’s protections.161 Rather, Bruce L. provides factors for 
courts to examine when determining whether an Indian father without physical custody has taken 
steps to establish a relationship with his child, which would fulfill the ICWA’s pre-existing 
custody requirement.162  
 
IV. FUTURE INDIAN CHILD ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS 
 
A. Cases 
Pre-2013 cases should guide future cases in developing standards to evaluate efforts 
toward parenthood by unwed fathers. The Oklahoma court’s analysis in In re Adoption of Baby 
Girl B. provides the basis for state courts to continue to apply the ICWA broadly and to limit the 
pre-existing custody requirement, without undermining Adoptive Couple, and with strong 
promotion of congressional policies.163 State courts need not automatically exclude unwed Indian 
fathers without physical custody from the ICWA’s protections.164 The pre-2013 state court cases 
demonstrate the types of acts by unwed fathers that would meet the pre-existing custody 
requirement of the ICWA.165 In Adoptive Couple, the Court found that by relinquishing parental 
rights, having no prior contact with his child, and failing to provide support and care, the 
biological father had made no effort to assume the responsibility of parenthood.166 But, where an 
unwed non-physical custodial father can demonstrate affirmative steps to take on the 
responsibility of parenthood, thereby establishing a level of custody, the father can be deemed to 
meet the ICWA’s pre-existing custody and the ICWA’s heightened protection should apply.167  
State courts should implement a reasonable-efforts standard, such as that found in Bruce 
L., which would also ensure that unwed fathers without physical custody are not automatically 
excluded from the ICWA’s protections.168 This standard provides an opportunity for an unwed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Id. 
160 See id. at 981. If a parent unjustifiably fails to provide child support for one year, that parent’s consent is not required for adoption. 
See id. at 979. Non-payment of child support is justified by evidence, such as W2 forms and pay stubs, of indigence. Id. at 981. 
161 See id. at 979, 981; see also Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the case did not involve a 
father who provided financial support or who visited the child).  
162 See Bruce L., 247 P.3d at 979; see Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring); see id. at 2575 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting); cf. id. at 2558–59 (majority opinion) (noting that the father relinquished his parental rights, failed to provide financial 
support, and had no contact with the child to find the father made no effort to assume the role of parenthood, suggesting that, absent a 
relinquishment of parental rights and affirmative steps toward parenthood, the ICWA may apply).  
163 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Girl B., 67 P.3d 359, 365–66 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003).  
164 See In re Baby Girl B., 67 P.3d at 366; see Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650, 653–54 (finding that the father’s various visits with 
the child established a parent-child relationship with the child so the father did not abandon the child); see Bruce L., 247 P.3d at 979 
(finding that “to qualify as an ICWA parent, an unwed father [without physical custody] does not need to comply perfectly with state 
laws for establishing paternity, so long as he has made reasonable efforts to acknowledge paternity,” suggests a similar standard could 
be used to establish pre-existing custody).  
165 See In re Baby Girl B., 67 P.3d at 366; see Claymore, 405 N.W.2d at 653–54; see Bruce L., 247 P.3d at 979; cf. Adoptive Couple, 
133 S. Ct. at 2558–59 (noting that the father’s failure to take steps toward parenthood and suggesting that affirmative steps toward 
parenthood, such as providing financial support, may establish pre-existing custody).  
166 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558–59. 
167 Cf. id. at 2558–59 (placing weight on the father’s relinquishment of parental rights, failure to provide financial support, and failure 
to have contact with the child to find the father made no effort to assume parenthood, and suggesting that where an unwed father 
without physical custody does take such steps, there is a level of custody to evaluate).  
168 See Bruce L., 247 P.3d at 979. 
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father to demonstrate that he has made reasonable efforts to take on the responsibility of 
parenthood, thereby fulfilling the pre-existing custody requirement.169 An ICWA custodial 
requirement sympathetic to biological fathers, children, and tribes can be implemented by states 
via cases or statutes. 
State lawmakers should not greatly limit the ICWA’s application by extending Adoptive 
Couple beyond its facts. It was an extreme case where the Court found there was absolutely no 
parent-child relationship and therefore there was no pre-existing custody.170 Adoptive Couple only 
limits the ICWA by narrowly construing the phrases “continued custody” and “breakup of an 
Indian family” found in §§ 1912(f) and 1912(d) to mean a “pre-existing state.”171 While an Indian 
child alone is no longer sufficient to trigger the ICWA’s protections,172 pre-existing custody 
should not always preclude the ICWA’s protections where an Indian parent “never had custody of 
[his or her] children, no matter how fully th[at] parent[] ha[s] embraced the financial and 
emotional responsibilities of parenting.”173 Such an interpretation moves away from the liberal 
applications of the ICWA following Holyfield by limiting the ICWA’s protections to Indian 
parents with physical custody.174  
Although Adoptive Couple places an additional condition on the ICWA’s application, the 
Supreme Court’s use of §§ 1912(f) and 1912(d) in an extreme setting does not significantly limit 
the ICWA’s protections. Rather, the ICWA should continue to have a broad scope.175 Sections 
1912(f) and 1912(d) on pre-existing custody should be able to be met without a showing of 
physical custody, which allows future courts to acknowledge the tribal interests in Indian children 
without undermining Adoptive Couple.176 The Court’s recognition in Holyfield that the ICWA 
presumes “that it is in the Indian child’s best interest that its relationship to the tribe be 
protected,” supports a flexible pre-existing custody requirement within the ICWA.177 As In re 
Baade illustrates, state courts interpreted Holyfield to find that the ICWA is broad in scope and 
open to a liberal interpretation in order to protect a tribe’s right to have its children raised in its 
community, with the ICWA applying in any custody proceeding involving an Indian child.178 
Despite the potential in Adoptive Couple to limit the ICWA, Holyfield and state courts’ 
applications of Holyfield support the view that Adoptive Couple is an extreme case and that the 
ICWA should broadly apply so that all efforts by Indian fathers aimed at parenthood are relevant 
to the ICWA’s pre-existing custody requirement.179 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 See id.; see also Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 1278–79 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that where non-physical custodial 
parents have taken on the financial and emotional responsibilities of parenthood, the ICWA’s protections should apply); cf. id. at 
2558–59 (majority opinion) (concluding that the father failed to take on the responsibility of parenthood based on several facts, such 
as the father’s failure to provide financial support); cf. id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the case does not involve a 
father who provided financial support or who had visitation). 
170 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560 (majority opinion). 
171 Id.  
172 In the case of an unwed father, he must also establish that he presently or previously had custody of the Indian child before the 
ICWA’s heightened protections for an Indian parent and child can apply. See id. at 2560–61. 
173 Id. at 2573 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
174 See id. at 2560 (majority opinion). 
175 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489 (S.D. 1990); Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966, 979 (Alaska 2011).  
176 See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560; Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34–37 (1989).  
177 Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 34–37, 49 n.24 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560–63; see id. at 
2571 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
178 In re Baade, 462 N.W.2d at 489–90. 
179 See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 34–37 (applying broadly the ICWA in order to protect tribes’ interests in their children); see In re Baade, 
462 N.W.2d at 489. 
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In re A.J.S. and In re Vincent M.180 also support a flexible pre-existing custody 
requirement to protect tribal interests in Indian children. In overturning the existing family 
doctrine, the In re A.J.S. court reasoned that competing interests, like the mother’s desire for the 
child to be adopted, do not nullify the interest of the tribe under the ICWA.181 The court found 
that the ICWA’s application in Indian child custody proceedings ensures that courts consider 
tribal interests alongside those interests of adoptive parents and birth mothers.182 Similarly, the 
court in In re Vincent M. reasoned that application of the ICWA’s protections in Indian custody 
proceedings does not necessarily mean the child’s placement will change; rather, the ICWA’s 
application ensures tribal interests are considered.183 A flexible application of the pre-existing 
custody requirement also ensures that tribal interests are safeguarded by providing an unwed, 
non-physical custodial father an opportunity to demonstrate sufficient efforts toward parenthood 
to meet pre-existing custody so that the ICWA’s protections apply.184 
Because In re Baade, In re Vincent M., and In re A.J.S. found that the ICWA’s 
protections should apply broadly in order to safeguard the legitimate interests of tribes, unwed 
Indian fathers without physical custody should not be automatically excluded from the ICWA’s 
protections.185 Giving unwed non-physical custodial fathers the opportunity to demonstrate 
meaningful steps toward parenthood safeguards tribal interests without undermining Adoptive 
Couple.186 
Decided by the California Court of Appeals in 2014, In re Alexandria P. also supports a 
flexible approach, noting that “Justice Scalia’s dissent in Adoptive Couple raises the question of 
whether visitation would be sufficient to warrant the ICWA’s protections under [§§] 1912(d) and 
(f).”187 The court goes on stating, “[h]owever, the [C]ourt does not address the concern beyond 
noting that such parents might receive protections under state law.”188 The California court’s 
evaluation of Adoptive Couple reinforces the idea that state courts have the ability and should 
take a flexible approach to the pre-existing custody requirement and suggests that courts should 
look to efforts by an Indian father, such as visitation when determining whether the ICWA’s 
protections apply.189 
B. Statutes 
State legislation in response to Holyfield also rejects the existing Indian family doctrine, 
reinforces the view that Adoptive Couple is an extreme case, and recognizes that states should 
take a flexible approach to the pre-existing custody requirement in order to preserve an Indian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 In re Vincent M., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 321 (Ct. App. 2007). Although the appellate court in In re Vincent M. rejected the existing 
Indian family doctrine, the California appellate courts are split on the doctrine’s continued validity. See In re Alexandria P., 176 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 468, 484–85 (Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted) (recognizing the split in California’s appellate districts and noting that four 
courts have rejected the doctrine while the other two courts have upheld the doctrine). The Second Appellate District of California 
recently repudiated the doctrine in In re Alexandria P. Id.  
181 In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 550–51 (Kan. 2009). 
182 Id.  
183 In re Vincent M., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 336. 
184 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2558, 2560–63 (2013) (providing efforts for state courts to examine through 
the facts the Court relied on to determine there was no pre-existing custody); cf. In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d at 550–51 (applying broadly the 
ICWA to protect tribes’ interests in their children).   
185 In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d at 550–51; In re Vincent M., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 337; In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489–90 (S.D. 
1990); see Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558, 2560–63. 
186 See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558, 2560–63; see id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
187 In re Alexandria P., 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 486 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2578–79 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting)).  
188 Id.   
189 See id. 
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child’s relationship with his or her tribe.190 Oklahoma,191 Washington,192 Minnesota,193 
Wisconsin,194 and California195 have all passed legislation aimed at ending the existing Indian 
family doctrine.196 At the heart of this legislation is the broad application of the ICWA to Indian 
child custody proceedings in order to protect tribes’ unique interest in their children.197 In 
Oklahoma, the statute specifically acknowledges the protection of tribes’ interest in their children, 
stating that the state’s policy “recognize[s] that Indian tribes and nations have a valid 
governmental interest in Indian children regardless of whether or not said children are in the 
physical or legal custody of an Indian parent or Indian custodian at the time state proceedings are 
initiated.”198 Likewise, a Wisconsin statute provides that the ICWA applies in “any Indian 
juvenile custody proceeding regardless of whether the Indian juvenile is in the legal custody or 
physical custody of an Indian parent.”199 A Minnesota statute also states that both the Minnesota 
Indian Preservation Act and “the federal Indian Child Welfare Act are applicable without 
exception in any child custody proceeding . . . involving an Indian child.”200 Similarly, in 
Washington the statute provides, “if the child is an Indian child [the Washington Indian Child 
Welfare Act] shall apply.”201 In 2006, the California legislature added to the Welfare and 
Institutions Code.202 Section 224 provides, “[i]t is in the interest of an Indian child that the child’s 
membership in the child’s Indian tribe and connection to the tribal community be encouraged and 
protected, regardless of whether the child is in the physical custody of an Indian parent or Indian 
custodian at the commencement of a child custody proceeding . . . .”203 Thus, the California 
legislature seeks “to protect and encourage an Indian child’s connection to the tribal community, 
regardless of the child’s prior connection to the tribe.”204  
These statutes recognize the emphasis in the ICWA on tribal interests in Indian children, 
regardless of present custody of the child, as well as, demonstrate how states can move to a broad 
application of the ICWA in order to safeguard tribal interests.205 Broad application of the ICWA 
through state legislation ensures safeguards for the interests of Indian parents and Indian tribes in 
their children.206 Although Adoptive Couple recognizes that pre-existing custody must be 
established under the ICWA, a flexible pre-existing custody standard should provide unwed non-
physical custodial Indian fathers an opportunity to demonstrate efforts to take on the role of 
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parenthood and not automatically exclude such fathers from the ICWA’s protections.207 This 
flexibility would promote congressional policies, as recognized in the congressional record and in 
Holyfield.208  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The pre-existing custody requirement of the ICWA should not automatically exclude 
unwed Indian fathers without physical custody from the ICWA’s protections.209 The extreme 
facts in Adoptive Couple should be recognized.210 In Adoptive Couple, there was no parent-child 
relationship because the unwed Indian father made no effort whatsoever to establish 
parenthood.211 As a result, the tribe in Adoptive Couple had no interest.212 Adoptive Couple should 
be read to mean that where there is some parent-child relationship, there is pre-existing custody. 
Many state courts and state legislatures have properly rejected the existing Indian family doctrine 
following Holyfield and have broadly applied the ICWA’s protections in order to safeguard the 
unique relationships at stake in a custody proceeding involving an Indian child. States must 
continue to promote the goals of the ICWA relating to Indian parents, children, and tribes.213  
Although there is a pre-existing custody requirement in the ICWA, it can be met without 
physical custody through employing a flexible standard. State courts and state legislatures should 
establish flexible standards allowing inquiries into the efforts by an unwed Indian father to 
assume parenthood.214 A flexible pre-existing custody requirement also safeguards tribal interests 
in Indian children without undermining Adoptive Couple.215 A flexible pre-existing custody 
requirement within the ICWA is needed to ensure congressional goals are met.216  
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